2009 may be make-or-break year with EU

Evaluating the most pressing issues facing Turkey this year, he stressed that the EU had notified the Turkish government in November that it was high time to focus again on the stalled reform efforts. Shrinking by the day, Turkey’s friends in the EU expect Ankara to restore its supporters’ confidence by taking bold steps in the political field, and there is much more to do for Turkey in terms of democratization and human rights, he explained.Professor Kalaycıoğlu shared his views with Monday Talk on the most critical issues the Turkish government will have to address in 2009, from its relations with the United States to its role in the UN Security Council.

What are your political and economic expectations for Turkey in the year 2009?

First of all, we should expect to see financial problems resulting from the global economic crisis dominate the scene. In addition, we have the local elections approaching in March, and the results may give us some idea about how well or poorly the political parties are doing. As of Jan. 1, Turkey became a temporary member of the UN Security Council [UNSC] and a lot of tough issues, including wars in Congo and the Israeli-Hamas conflict, and others in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are awaiting our attention. Then we have a number of foreign policy issues, such as relations with the European Union, which have become tied to the issue of Cyprus, where talks have been continuing between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Are the Cyprus talks essential to easing Turkey-EU relations, since many negotiation chapters remain suspended by the EU, which says Turkey should first open its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot traffic?

We don’t know the details of the talks between the Turkish and Greek sides on the island. However, if the EU expects Turkey to do something, the feeling in Turkey -- the government included -- is that Turkey has already done its share. Turkish Cypriots, supported by Turkey, approved the UN-mediated Annan plan to reunify the island in 2004 just prior to the EU accession of Greek Cyprus as the official government of the Republic of Cyprus. But the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan and, by extension, the reuniting of the island. Now, having been accepted into the EU as a full member, the ball is in the Greek Cypriots’ court.

What do you think they should do?

The Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government alike expect the Greek side to agree on a federal structure with two states and thereby unify the island. In addition, the guarantee agreements of 1959-1960 should continue. The rest would be about legal-technical details, which will take some time to solve. The main issue is about the definition of the structure of the state of Cyprus.

Can’t Turkey open its ports to the Greek Cypriot traffic to show the EU that it is willing to overcome deadlocks because it wants membership?

It is possible. Turkey closed its ports after 1984, so Turkish ports had been open to Greek Cypriot traffic before. But Turkey has had a new political stance since 2004. In that case, why should Turkey take another goodwill step without guaranteeing the Turkish Cypriots’ well-being is not so clear to Turks. There is a problem of trust between the sides and, without establishing trust, Turkey will not change its stance because we have had too many bad experiences.

Would you elaborate on this idea?

When we academics talk with our EU counterparts, we ask them if Turkey would be accepted in the EU with full membership if it renounced its right to Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and they still cannot say “yes.” Such a relationship, in which, when one side says it is ready to do anything to be accepted into the EU, but the other side is still not sure, is hard to sustain. But if the EU is also ready to give credible guarantees to Turkey about full membership, then Turkey can consider changing its stance. Secondly, the problem was supposed to be solved by the UN. It is not Turkey that asked the EU to make the Cyprus problem a problem of the EU. That was done solely by the EU when it admitted Cyprus into the union in 2004 as a representative of the entire island, even though the island had been divided into a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north. Currently the Turkish Cypriots cannot take full advantage of the EU membership of the island because their status is not clear. Since the EU has been willing to make Cyprus a problem of its own, it is welcome to solve it as well and improve the status of the Turkish Cypriots to the level of the Greek Cypriots.

‘Turkey would not like to trigger civil war in Iraq’

As there are growing relations between Turkey and the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq, is there a possibility that Turkey could recognize the regional government?

Turkey started to develop more relations with the northern Iraqi administration in 2008, but it would not be an easy step to recognize that administration officially, because such a move would jeopardize Iraq’s territorial integrity, which, in turn, may have negative repercussions for the whole region.

Could you elaborate on this?

Iran has been trying to increase its influence in the region, especially in parts of Baghdad and in southern Iraq. If Iraq’s territorial integrity is damaged, neighboring states could be drawn into the Iraqi mess. Turkey would not want to trigger such a development. Since the central administration of Iraq is not very strong, they told Turkey to go and talk with the regional administration to get support for the fight against terrorism. What needs to be done is to strengthen the central administration in Iraq while respecting and supporting the rights of the ethnic groups in the country. This is what the United States tries to do, but it is very difficult while the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north are all armed. So a civil war is a possibility that must be avoided. In addition, there has been a historic change in Iraq. Throughout most of its history, Iraq has been governed by the Sunnis even though the Shiites have been in the majority. Now the Shiites, due to their sheer numbers, have the opportunity to govern in a democratic Iraq. It’s not an easy change for the country, since Shiites have been sidelined in the history of the Middle East and seen as a threat to most governments in the region.

‘Turkey-Armenia rapprochement fragile’

Do you think Turkey will open its border with Armenia this year?

Turkey has traditionally made the opening of the border with Armenia conditional on the development of good relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. But there is no such development in sight.

But Turkey has given some signs that it may remove its conditions…

Then there would be a major Turkish foreign policy change, meaning that Turkey would change the course of its relations with Azerbaijan, as well. Turkey and Azerbaijan share the same culture. In addition, Turkey has ties with Azerbaijan over the energy corridor in the region. If Turkey can establish better relations with Armenia without shattering its relations with Azerbaijan, then it could be achieved.

What can Turkey do to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan happy?

If President Abdullah Gül had been able to convince Azeri President Ilham Aliyev to go along with him when he went to Yerevan last year, a balancing act could have been possible. Remember the protests by the Azerbaijani government when President Gül went to Yerevan! Turkey needs to think of the negative repercussions of abandoning Azerbaijan while approaching Armenia. On the other hand, how Yerevan will be able to go forward with its relations with Ankara is also questionable. There are influential factors outside of Armenia. One of them is the Armenian diaspora. The other one is Russia. Armenia is dependent on Russia, particularly when it comes to security relations. And then there are the United States and, to some extent, the European Union, both of which have influential relations with Armenia. Additionally, President Gül implied recently that the rapprochement could be hurt by the signature campaign from Turkish intellectuals [apologizing for the killings and forced deportations of Anatolian Armenians in the World War-I era]. That means that the rapprochement is quite fragile.

‘Middle East too hard for Turkey to deal with’

Will Turkey be able to follow up on its initiatives to solve the crisis in Gaza?

We first have to understand what is going on there, where several forces have been clashing. First, there is a conflict between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas is eyeing the seat of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Hamas tries to thrive on the fact that Fatah recognizes Israel and has a pro-peace stance, which has cost them dearly in popular support. On the other side, Hamas props up the image of resistance to Israel and presses for the rights of the Palestinians. So Hamas provoked Israel with its attacks and Israel responded. That was the explanation of Abbas, who blamed the rival Hamas group for triggering Israel’s deadly raids on Gaza by ending a six-month truce with Israel. Moreover, there are more tensions between moderate and radical rival camps in the Arab world.

What are those tensions?

Amid the recent Gaza bombings, Hezbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah called on millions of Egyptians to take to the streets to protest their government’s response to the Israeli attack. He also called for uprisings throughout the Arab and Islamic world and said he supported a third Palestinian intifada. So the picture looks like this: Hamas is supported by Hezbullah, Hezbullah is supported by Syria and Syria is supported by Iran. Egypt officially barred aid from reaching Gaza from its soil because it feels threatened by Iran and Syria, which seem to be pressuring Egypt through their proxy Hamas. So there seems to be a confrontation between Egypt and Iran.

What would you say about the US factor?

It is the third factor in this complicated equation. We don’t know what the new administration will do. Maybe Israel is trying to take advantage of the lame-duck US presidency because the new administration would stress diplomacy more than the use of force. And, of course, Hamas is also trying to use the situation for its own advantage.

So what about Turkey?

Under the circumstances, how Turkey could convince Egypt and Iran to agree on a solution while at the same time getting together with Israel and the Palestinians to have them start a cease-fire while keeping the US out of this equation is a puzzle to solve.

Which camp do you think Turkey feels closer to in the region?

Turkey in the past has tried to help the Palestinians economically in Gaza, even after Hamas took over the region. For example, it offered to build a free-trade zone in Gaza. However, it seems like Hamas is less interested in the economic development of Gaza and more interested in a war of attrition and prefers to buy bombs and arms, where Iran seems to come into the picture. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia feel threatened by Iran’s rising influence. Does the Turkish government feel threatened by Iran, as well? We don’t know. If Turkey feels closer to Iran, then it would have to face negative reactions from such traditional allies as the United States, NATO and the EU, as well as the above-mentioned states in the region. In the end, Turkey cannot afford to expend its energy and finite resources to convince all sides and achieve a resolution in the very slippery Middle East.

Where do you think Turkey should expend its energy?

First, Turkey should invest more in its relations with the EU because the hour of reckoning is close. Warning Turkey, the EU said it would review the situation once again in 2009. Turkey has fallen behind in some of its democratization and human rights reforms. It should revive the reform process so the supporters of Turkey in the EU will find ammunition in their hands to defend Turkey against the non-supporter camp. Secondly, a new administration is coming to the United States. Turkey needs to establish ties with the Obama administration. There is another “genocide” resolution in the US Congress waiting to come to light in April and it is full of claims, such as massacres that took place in the 1920s, which are neither true nor acceptable. I am sure the Turkish government will have its hands full with such matters that need to be clarified with the Obama administration.

‘Stronger mandate in local elections does not mean more reforms’

“The ruling Justice and Development Party’s [AK Party] performance at the March 29 local elections will not provide motivation for it to follow a more reformist course. What we have seen following the July 2007 election is that a stronger mandate does not correspond to a more reformist approach, even though that’s what the AK Party spokespersons had promised. If they increase their support, such a record will only reinforce their belief in what they had been doing and motivate them to be complacent. If they have a drop in support at the polls, then they may re-evaluate their policies.”

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu

A professor of political science at Sabancı University’s faculty of arts and social sciences, he was formerly the rector of Işık University in İstanbul from 2004 to 2007. Professor Kalaycıoğlu is a student of comparative politics and specializes in political representation and participation. He has published on those two fields internationally. He has authored and co-edited six books in Turkish on comparative political participation, including a textbook on contemporary political science and several co-edited books on Turkish politics. In English he co-edited “Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s” (1995), authored “Turkish Dynamics: A Bridge across Troubled Lands” (2005) and co-authored, with Ali Carkoğlu of Sabancı University, “Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society” (2007).

YONCA POYRAZ DOĞAN  İSTANBUL

05.01.2009